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Note
Playing by The Rules (Or Not): How the Court’s
Misuse of Rule 59 Threatens to Undermine Qualified
Immunity and the Civil Jury Trial
KIMBERLY BOSSE
The civil jury trial is uniquely American. Though many countries utilize a jury
system for conducting criminal trials, the trial by jury in civil matters is something
seen almost exclusively in the United States, and has been a cornerstone of the
American judicial system since the Colonial Era. However, many scholars have
lamented what they refer to as the “vanishing jury trial,” due to increased use of
alternative dispute resolution and settlements to resolve cases without a trial or
jury. Now, in addition to pre-trial dispute resolution, a new trend has emerged
which threatens to further undermine the American civil jury system as well as the
doctrine of qualified immunity.
The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution provides a right to a civil jury trial
by one’s peers to every American citizen. Yet, in the District of Connecticut, it has
twice occurred that a Rule 59 Motion for a New Trial has been used in an apparent
attempt to override a jury verdict in favor of police officer defendants, despite a lack
of legal precedent supporting the move. These two cases are Bryant v. Meriden
Police Department and Huaman ex rel. J.M. v. Tinsley.
Of these two cases, the Huaman parties have subsequently settled—replacing
the jury’s no-liability judgment with an over $300,000 payment to plaintiffs—and
the Bryant parties have given oral arguments in front of the Second Circuit. If the
Second Circuit were to affirm Bryant, and the manner in which Rule 59 was utilized
is given precedential effect, there may be severe repercussions. First, qualified
immunity would be weakened due to the removal of the reasonableness inquiry from
the hands of the jury. Additionally, the civil jury trial itself would only be rendered
further obsolete, as the verdicts that juries hand down would become significantly
more vulnerable to being taken away by a judge who disagrees with the result.
Either of these outcomes would undeniably alter the U.S. legal landscape, and
neither would be an alteration for the better.
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Playing by The Rules (Or Not): How the Court’s
Misuse of Rule 59 Threatens to Undermine Qualified
Immunity and the Civil Jury Trial
KIMBERLY BOSSE *
INTRODUCTION
The civil jury trial is in trouble. For years, the trend of encouraging
settlement, opting for alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), and granting
pre-trial dispositive motions has quickened in pace, resulting in a drastic
decline in the percentage of cases that not only reach the trial stage, but that
also are resolved by a jury verdict.1 The notion of determining liability
through a jury of one’s peers is one of the oldest and foremost foundational
precepts upon which the American legal system was constructed,2and it now
faces serious threat of effective eradication.
This trend—“the vanishing jury trial” as it has been called3—has been
thoroughly studied and discussed, and has served as the subject of reputable
symposia dedicated to understanding the causes and effects of such a
growing phenomenon.4 Legal scholars have posited a number of possible
contributing effects, three of which appear to be the most prominently
*
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2019; Hofstra University, B.A. 2016. I
would like to thank attorneys Jim Tallberg, Scott Karsten, Pat Allen, Dennis Durao, and Andrew Glass
for awakening my interest in such a pivotal area of the law and for allowing me to dig my hands into the
cases that serve as the focus of this Note. Without their guidance and constant support, this paper would
not exist. I would also like to thank my Notes & Comments editor Jessica Colin-Greene, as well as the
tireless members of the Connecticut Law Review for their assistance and thoughtful suggestions
throughout the publication process.
1
See Marc Galanter & Angela M. Frozena, A Grin Without a Cat: The Continuing Decline &
Displacement of Trials in American Courts, 143 DÆDALUS J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 115, 116 (2014)
(citing data on the decline in percentage of cases tried in front of juries which dropped from 5.49 percent
of all cases in 1962, to 2.33 percent in 1985, and to a mere 0.73 percent in 2012).
2
See Hon. William G. Young, Who’s to Blame? A View From the Bench, Address at the New
York University School of Law Civil Jury Project Conference: State of the Civil Jury Trial (Sept. 11,
2015) [hereinafter Young, A View From the Bench] (“The greatest contribution of American
jurisprudence in the history of the world is our judicial independence and our American jury trial
system.”); see also Hon. William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution,
40 SUFFOLK L. REV. 67, 69 (2006) (describing the American jury as being “as American as rock ‘n’ roll”).
3
Hon. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Where Have You Gone, Spot Mozingo? A Trial Judge’s Lament
Over the Demise of the Civil Jury Trial, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 99, 101 (2010).
4
The Civil Jury Project operates out of New York University School of Law. It conducts research
and hosts conferences to discuss the causes and effects of the disappearing civil jury trial. CIVIL JURY
PROJECT, http://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/ [https://perma.cc/45UW-BYQQ] (last visited Feb. 12,
2018).
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suggested avenues of causation. Judicial encouragement of pre-trial
resolution, increases in use of ADR, and dispositive pre-trial motions have
all significantly slashed the frequency of cases being tried, generally.
Among the many critics of this trend, Judge William Young of the District
of Massachusetts has been vocal about the Seventh Amendment implications
this trend carries with it.6 The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides that:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.7
Cases that are resolved through ADR, settlement, or dispositive motions,
deprive parties of truly having their “day in court,” which, as many brighteyed law students quickly learn, is a right inhered to every citizen who finds
himself in a legal bind.8
Although it is true that these three avenues of causation have contributed
to the decline in civil jury trial prevalence, a fourth avenue is emerging
which is unique from the other three. This fourth avenue, a post-trial Rule
59 motion for a new trial, may begin to change the way scholars evaluate the
disappearing nature of civil jury trials. Until now, the predominant
hypothesis on the issue has been that the pre-trial resolution and disposal of
cases ex ante has brought cases to a halt before a jury could be called upon,
therefore eliminating the jury’s presence in daily court practice.9 Rule 59,
however, is beginning to reveal itself as a tool for judges to eviscerate and
make an ex post facto end-run around the Seventh Amendment right to a
civil jury after a jury has rendered its decision.
5
See Anderson, supra note 3, at 105, 108 (listing factors contributing to the decline of the jury trial
including: (1) the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts’ emphasis on docket management; (2) increasing
resolution through ADR; and (3) legal costs); see also Galanter & Frozena, supra note 1, at 125
(“[Judges’] role as gatekeepers is enlarged, especially (in the federal courts, at least) by the elaboration
of summary judgment (which now accounts for far more terminations than trials).”); Patrick E.
Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 1423 (2002) (lamenting
that trials are often viewed as a failed effort at dispute resolution, and calling on the system to keep trials
alive, despite the benefits that settlements offer).
6
See Hon. William G Young, Speech at Judicial Luncheon at The Florida Bar’s Annual Convention
in Orlando (June 28, 2007) (“How is it possible [that the American jury system is dying], with our
Constitution and every one of the 50 state constitutions guaranteeing the right to a trial by jury? . . . The
jury—direct democracy—is the most vital expression of local government—state or federal—that
exists.”).
7
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
8
See Galanter & Frozena, supra note 1, at 115 (“Common expressions such as having one’s ‘day
in court,’. . . reflect [the] cultural presence [that courts carry in American life].”).
9
See Anderson, supra note 3, at 109 (discussing legal tools that work to resolve cases before they
reach the trial stage).
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Granting a new trial after a jury verdict significantly increases the
incentive to settle by giving leverage to the party who made the motion.
Cases that do end in settlement ultimately avoid a jury verdict. In cases
where the parties still refuse to settle, however, the new trial carries a burden
of extra expenses; instead of footing the bill for one full trial, parties must
instead pay for two. In civil rights cases, this also means the potential for a
prevailing plaintiff to receive attorney’s fees as a part of their recovery.10
Most critically, though, defendants sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may find
themselves unreasonably and inappropriately exposed to liability and a
second lawsuit even after a jury has determined that their actions did not
constitute a violation of the Constitution. Since the purpose of the qualified
immunity affirmative defense to § 1983 claims is ultimately to provide
protection from both liability and lawsuit to government officials when their
actions were reasonable, Rule 59 threatens to weaken the defense by keeping
the reasonableness inquiry out of the hands of the jury.11 The new trend—
though in its early stages—of using Rule 59 motions for a new trial to
circumvent a jury verdict with which a judge—based on factors ranging
from incorrect legal analysis to self-serving aspirations—simply just
disagrees, is a potentially dangerous pattern that, if let to continue, could set
a severe and irreparable precedent that significantly diminishes the
importance of the American civil jury beyond the point to which it has
already fallen.
This Note will discuss the evolution of the American judicial system
towards becoming more of a managerial body than one that actually
encourages bringing cases to trial. In particular, this Note will focus on two
recently tried cases within the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut, and how their unprecedented results may have a serious impact
on the operation of the federal judicial system, and more specifically on the
ability for defendants to utilize the qualified immunity safeguard. Part I will
discuss the history of the civil jury trial and the importance of the Seventh
Amendment within the context of United States constitutional history. Part
II will discuss the Rule 59 standard, as well as explain the significance of
the qualified immunity doctrine, before proceeding to introduce the cases—
Bryant v. Meriden Police Department12 (“Bryant”) and Huaman ex rel. J.M.
10

See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
section[] . . . 1983 . . . of this title . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”).
11
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009) (citations omitted) (“Because qualified
immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . it is effectively lost if a case
is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Indeed, we have made clear that the driving force behind creation
of the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that insubstantial claims against government
officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery. Accordingly, we repeatedly have stressed the importance
of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”).
12
Bryant v. Meriden Police Dep’t, No. 3:13-cv-449(SRU), 2017 WL 1217090 (D. Conn. Mar. 31,
2017), appeal filed, 2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2017.
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v. Tinsley (“Huaman” or “Huaman v. Tinsley”). These two cases were tried
to a jury verdict in the District of Connecticut in 2017 and both illustrate the
pattern of using Rule 59 as a runaround with regards to the Seventh
Amendment. Part III will look into possible incentives for both judges’
decisions to grant the post-trial Rule 59 motions, and will explore possible
repercussions for allowing the trend to continue as-is. It will then conclude
with a suggested solution to the particular problem pertaining to the qualified
immunity catch-22 that is created in both of the scenarios illustrated by
Bryant and Huaman.
I.

HISTORY OF JURY TRIALS AND IMPORTANCE OF THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT

The American civil jury trial is a phenomenon that is unmatched
anywhere else in the world.14 Although a number of countries use juries to
decide criminal trials, civil jury trials are almost nonexistent outside of the
United States.15 There are conflicting opinions on whether the right to a jury
in a civil trial under the Seventh Amendment is as inherent and guaranteed
as the parallel right to a jury of one’s peers in a criminal proceeding under
the Sixth Amendment.16 For example, Edith Henderson posits that from the
time of the drafting of the Constitution, there was argument over whether to
explicitly provide for civil juries in the original document.17 Ultimately,
Henderson describes how trial by jury in civil cases was left out of the final
document; she seems to propose the idea that the only reason the Seventh
Amendment was included at all was to assuage the fears of Anti-Federalists,
who were worried civil juries would cease to exist altogether.18 Henderson
chalks the intentional omission of a guaranteed right to a civil jury up to
laziness of the drafters, implying that they simply did not care enough and
just “wanted to go home.”19
13

Huaman ex rel. J.M., v. Tinsley, No. 3:13-cv-484(MPS), 2017 WL 4365155 (D. Conn. Sept. 28,

2017).
14
See Neil Vidmar, A Historical and Comparative Perspective on the Common Law Jury, in
WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 1, 3 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000) (“[W]ith the exception of the United States and
parts of Canada, the jury has been largely abandoned for civil cases. . . .”).
15
Id.
16
See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289,
293 (1966) (noting that during the Federal Convention of 1787, “broad general outlines” of what Article
III would look like required a jury trial in criminal cases, but made no mention of civil cases). Contra
Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 381, 381 (Neil Vidmar ed.,
2000) (“Americans have relied on juries of ordinary citizens to resolve their civil disputes since the
beginning of the colonial period.”).
17
See Henderson, supra note 16, at 293 (“On August 27 and 28 the convention as a whole discussed
the judiciary articles, without, however, touching on juries in civil cases.”).
18
See id. at 294 (“It is not surprising that this omission of a right which was universally considered
important—and indeed any bill of rights at all—alarmed the Anti-Federalists.”).
19
Id.
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One of the justifications for the original omission of this right to a civil
jury stemmed from the wide range of civil jury practices among the many
states.20 From the Federalist perspective, it made more sense to allow the
states to determine situations in which civil juries would be most effective,
rather than to have the federal government try to account for the variations
in an overbroad protection.21 The Anti-Federalists were not persuaded,
however, as illustrated by arguments based around the propositions of wellknown figures like Patrick Henry, as well as those published in papers
written in support of various constitutional provisions.22 At the Virginia
Convention, delegates echoed some of Henry’s propositions for
amendments that advocated for the protection of the civil jury, calling the
jury “one of the greatest securities to the rights of the people,” and arguing
that it should “remain sacred and inviolable.”23 Ultimately, protection for the
civil jury trial came in the form of the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution, which has remained a cornerstone of the American legal
system to this day.24
Judge William Young of the District of Massachusetts, an ardent
supporter of the American civil jury trial, is well-written on this topic and
has spoken at prominent conventions advocating for its preservation.25 At a
symposium held by New York University School of Law’s Civil Jury
Project, Judge Young gave a speech in which he mentioned that ninety
percent of the jury trials in the world are held in America.26 He recounted
how in the thirty years during which he has been a judge, the perception of
trials has declined from them being a common, useful legal proceeding to
something described as being similar to telephone landlines, “useful in
some circumstances, but not the principal means of dispute resolution.”27
The drop in the percentage of jury trials nationwide is staggering,28 and to
anyone who learns about the American legal system by watching
syndicated TV dramas, it may be difficult to understand. After all, the
impression of the way in which the American judicial branch functions is
rooted mainly in the notion of judge, jury, and trial. Granted, it may be
20
See id. (“The explanation given by the Federalists [was] that because of the great diversity of
state civil practice no single formula could satisfy everyone. . . .”).
21
Id.
22
Id. at 296–99.
23
Id. at n.17 with accompanying text.
24
See Landsman, supra note 16, at 386 (describing how the right to a civil jury, though left out of
the original Constitution document, was incorporated into it as its Seventh Amendment).
25
See Young, supra notes 2, 6 (providing an overview of Judge Young’s comments).
26
Young, A View From the Bench, supra note 2.
27
Id.
28
While in the 1930s—prior to the implementation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure—approximately 20 percent of all cases were resolved in a trial setting. Currently less than 2
percent of all federal civil filings are resolved by a jury trial. John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of
Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L. J. 522, 524 (2012).
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hard to create an invigorating TV drama that revolves around a judge who
resolves every issue through in-chambers mediation, or around lawyers
who exclusively negotiate and draft settlement agreements. Trials are
exciting, captivating, and for many aspiring law students and lawyers, the
reason they went to law school.29 Given the reality of the percentage of
cases that make it to trial now, with judges acting more as case managers
than adjudicators,30 it is hard not to question whether the story we have all
been told about the law is anything other than a misconception, or more, a
deception.
II.

THE TREND, QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AND THE CASES

A. The Trend – Rule 50 vs. 59
While much of the appeal of a common law system of jurisprudence
stems from its balance between predictable outcomes based on precedent,
and flexibility to make change through the development of law outside the
legislature, one of the more rigid aspects of the American judicial system is
seen in the rules that govern the processes by which these rulings, verdicts,
and precedents come about. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”)
lay out, in explicit terms, the proper form and governing conduct to which
attorneys and judges are expected to adhere.31 FRCP Rule 50, for example,
provides the standard for making a motion for a judgment as a matter of
law.32 The Rule states that a party may make a “motion for a judgment as a
matter of law . . . at any time before a case is submitted to the jury” for
deliberation, at which point the judge may either grant the motion, or reserve
ruling on the motion until after judgment has entered.33 If the judge reserves
ruling, or does not grant the Rule 50(a) motion initially, the party may renew
its motion after trial no later than twenty-eight days after judgment enters.34
Therefore, if you have not properly pleaded under Rule 50(a) at the
appropriate time, you will not be allowed to make a successful motion under
Rule 50(b), regardless of whether all parties consent, or if the presiding

29

See Anderson, supra note 3, at 100 (stating that after 23 years on the bench he still gets nervous
when the jury returns with a verdict).
30
See Langbein, supra note 28, at 571 (citations omitted) (“Judges have welcomed the case
management role, which has enhanced judicial authority both in promoting settlement and in pre-trial
(nontrial) adjudication.”).
31
FED. R. CIV. P. 1. See also Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking
Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 323, 326 (1991) (“The new rules—which persist today through
numerous subsequent amendments—established a uniform federal procedure . . . .”).
32
FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
33
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
34
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
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judge feels it would be appropriate; the Rule does not allow for exception
unless it would prevent a “manifest injustice.”35
B. Rule 59 Standard
Rule 59 is listed as the proper procedure through which parties may
make motions for a new trial following the entry of judgment.36 Although
they do not produce the same result, Rule 50 and Rule 59 motions may both
be used to combat adverse judgments post-trial. But while Rule 50 motions
must be made according to the subsection (a) and (b) standards, Rule 59
motions have no prerequisites under the FRCP.37 Therefore, Rule 50 and
Rule 59 motions are often brought together, with the latter being brought in
the alternative.
Following a jury trial, a judge may grant a new trial, “for any reason for
which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal
court.”38 Case law has interpreted this standard to allow judges to grant new
trials when, after weighing the evidence and its credibility, it deems the
verdict to be “a seriously erroneous result or . . . a miscarriage of justice.”39
However, judges must still give great deference to the jury verdict.40
Therefore, situations where a judge disagrees with the verdict based on
factual conclusions drawn from the evidence do not warrant the grant of a
new trial.41

35

Broadnax v. City of New Haven, 415 F.3d 265, 268 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Cruz v. Local Union
No. 3 of the Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1155 (2d Cir. 1994)). See also Bracey v. Bd. of
Educ. of Bridgeport, 368 F.3d 108, 117 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[The failure to move for a directed verdict during
trial] may not be waived by the parties or excused by the district court.”). But parties who appropriately
move for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 may also move, in the alternative, for a new trial.
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b), (e).
36
FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A).
37
See id. (emphasis added) (“The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the
issues . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action
at law in federal court . . . .”).
38
Id.
39
Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 392 (2d Cir. 2005). See also DLC Mgmt. Corp. v.
Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 1998) (permitting the grant of a new trial when jury
verdicts are against the weight of the evidence).
40
See DLC Mgmt. Corp., 163 F.3d at 134 (stating that the court “should rarely disturb a jury’s
evaluation of a witness’s credibility”).
41
This notion dates back to the eighteenth century in common law England. See Henderson, supra
note 16, at 311 (quoting Mellin v. Taylor, 3 Bing. N.C. 109, 132 Eng. Rep. 351 (C.P.)) (citing Chief
Justice Tindal’s reasoning that “[t]he Court ought to exercise, not merely a cautious, but a strict and sure
judgment, before they send the case to a second jury . . . the setting aside [of the verdict] is the exception,
and ought to be an exception of rare and almost singular recurrence . . . .”); see also id. at 312 (quoting
Swain v. Hall, 3 Wilson 45 (1770)) (pointing to Chief Justice Wilmot’s refusal to grant a new trial on the
grounds that, “[I]f there hath been a contrariety of evidence on both sides, the Court hath never granted
new trials . . . and although I am still of opinion, that the weight of evidence was with the plaintiff, yet I
disclaim any power to controul the verdict of the jury, who are the legal constitutional judges of fact”).
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C. Qualified Immunity & The Cases
Recently, two District of Connecticut cases—both with remarkably
similar procedural histories—have been handled in almost identical and yet
unprecedented fashion. Bryant v. Meriden Police Department,42 a case
involving a claim of excessive force over the use of a Taser device in a
holding cell, and Huaman v. Tinsley,43 dealing with claims of excessive force
as a result of putting hands on and physically moving a non-compliant truant
child, serve as two examples of a budding trend in the District of
Connecticut. Both cases feature federal judges granting plaintiff-made Rule
59 motions following jury verdicts for the defendants.44 In both situations,
Rule 59 motions were made as “in the alternative” motions attached onto
improperly pleaded Rule 50(b) motions. In both situations, because they
could not grant the improperly pleaded Rule 50(b) motions,45 the judges
granted the alternative motions for new trials, each issuing lengthy opinions
as to their reasoning.46 Ultimately, however, both judges—for whatever their
underlying reasons may have been, as will be discussed, infra—stretched to
reach conclusions and applied incorrect legal analysis, effectively usurping
the constitutionally-sanctioned power of the jury in granting both new trials.
1. Qualified Immunity
Before jumping into the factual circumstances of the two cases at issue,
it is important to first lay some groundwork with regard to the doctrine of
qualified immunity and how it is affected by this new procedural
conundrum. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense used to shield
government officials from liability and/or lawsuits when any reasonable
official could have thought the actions taken were lawful at the time they
occurred.47 This doctrine developed in order to ensure that government
officials are shielded from burdensome litigation when the actions they took

42
Bryant v. Meriden Police Dep’t, No. 3:13-cv-449 (SRU), 2017 WL 1217090, at *1–2, 5 (D.
Conn. Mar. 31, 2017), appeal filed, 2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2017.
43
Huaman ex rel. J.M., v. Tinsley, No. 3:13-cv-484 (MPS), 2017 WL 4365155, at *1 (D. Conn.
Sept. 28, 2017).
44
Bryant, 2017 WL 1217090, at *15; Huaman, 2017 WL 4365155, at *18.
45
See Bryant, 2017 WL 1217090, at *3 (“Bryant provides no reason why he should be excused
from his failure to comply with Rule 50. Accordingly, his Rule 50 motion is denied.”); Huaman, 2017
WL 4365155, at *7 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (“Huaman provides no reason why she should
be excused from her failure to comply with Rule 50. Accordingly, her Rule 50 motion is denied.”).
46
The version issued by the court in Bryant was thirty-two pages, while Huaman was thirty-six.
47
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982)) (explaining that the “doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known’”).
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were reasonable, in order to safeguard their ability to perform their job
without hesitation or fear of suit.48
Saucier v. Katz emphasized the two-prong analysis to be used in
assessing whether qualified immunity should apply to a given situation.49
The first prong of the analysis looks at whether a constitutional violation has
occurred, while the second prong evaluates whether the constitutional right
in question was clearly established.50 To be clearly established, there does
not necessarily need to be a specific “case on point” to make a government
official aware that their conduct is squarely governed by existing law.51
However, not every similar factual scenario may be sufficient to put a
government official on notice.52
In making a clearly established determination, courts consider whether
every reasonable official in that particular situation would have known his
conduct to be unlawful—or in other words, whether any reasonable officer
in that situation could possibly think his actions were legal.53 There is no set
order in which the prongs must be considered.54 Within the second prong is
48

See Nicholas T. Davis & Philip B. Davis, Qualified Immunity and Excessive Force: A Greater
or Lesser Role for Juries?, 47 N.M. L. REV. 291, 293 (2017) (“Qualified immunity developed in the
context of case law rising from 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, which permits citizens to hold state government
officials accountable for their actions through civil suit[,] . . . exist[s] in tension with the Supreme Court’s
belief that officers should not be punished for the reasonable belief that they are acting correctly under
the law when the law itself is not clearly established.”).
49
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“A court required to rule upon the qualified
immunity issue must consider . . . this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party
asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? . . . If
no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity
for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. On the other hand, if a violation could be made out
on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was
clearly established. This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken in light of the specific context of
the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . .”).
50
Id. What constitutes clearly established law has been the subject of an enormous amount of
litigation. See Davis & Davis, supra note 48, at 298 (citing Golodner v. Berliner, 770 F.3d 196, 205 (2d
Cir. 2014)) (“Few issues related to qualified immunity have caused more ink to be spilled than whether
a particular right has been clearly established . . . .”); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)
(“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual
circumstances.”).
51
See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (“We do not require a case directly on point,
but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”).
52
See id. at 742 (reiterating the principal that what is considered to be “clearly established law”
should not be assessed at a high level of generality because the law must be clearly established with
regards to the particular conduct at issue); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)
(holding that in order for a law to be “clearly established” it must be “particularized” to the fact of the
case at hand and not a broad generalization); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (citing Anderson,
483 U.S. at 640) (“As this court explained decades ago, the clearly established law must be
‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.”).
53
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of
force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight.”).
54
See Davis & Davis, supra note 48, at 294 (“The Supreme Court has most recently held that which
of the two prongs is addressed first in the qualified immunity analysis is at the discretion of the court in
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another layer of analytical considerations, referred to as the Graham Factors,
which come from the landmark case Graham v. Connor.55 The Graham
Factors consist of three inquiries that help determine whether the actions
taken by a police officer that led to the lawsuit were objectively
unreasonable and, therefore, whether a reasonable officer in that situation
could have thought that their actions were lawful.56 The Graham Factor
analysis considers: (1) the “severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and
(3) “whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.”57 These factors render the subjective intent of any officer
irrelevant and only consider the objective reasonableness of the actions
taken.58
The intricate, multi-layered qualified immunity analysis exists to protect
government officials, more often than not police officers, from being overburdened with frivolous lawsuits. Police officers find themselves in
situations where they must make “split-second judgments”59 on a daily
basis—and it is this ability to make quick decisions which, in many cases,
can mean the difference between life or death for a victim they may be trying
to protect. Therefore, overcoming the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity requires claimants to satisfy an understandably high bar.60 Further,
the Supreme Court recently issued a ruling emphasizing the need to uphold
this high bar.61 In White v. Pauly, in a per curiam opinion, the Court chastised
lower courts for continuously applying the qualified immunity standard
incorrectly.62 White v. Pauly instructs lower courts to adhere to the standard,
the light of the circumstances at hand.” (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234, 236 (2009)
(reconsidering the “rigid order of battle” required in the Saucier analysis, and holding that “it should no
longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be
permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”))).
55
Graham, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
56
See id. at 397 (“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the
question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”).
57
Id. at 396. Graham explains that the reasonableness inquiry requires a balance between the
“nature and quality of the intrusion” on the individual’s right to be free from a constitutional violation,
and the governmental interest that led to the intrusion. Id. The court then lists the non-exhaustive factors,
mentioned supra, as considerations in this analysis.
58
See id. at 397 (“An officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of
an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively
unreasonable use of force constitutional.”).
59
See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 466 (2011) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97) (“[T]he
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to
make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”).
60
See Davis & Davis, supra note 48, at 294 (discussing the “heavy” burden placed on plaintiffs
trying to defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity).
61
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 553 (2017).
62
Id. at 551.
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instead of defining what is “clearly established” at “a high level of
generality.”63 The opinion speaks to the importance of qualified immunity
and how it should effectively protect “all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law”64 which, alone, illustrates the high
threshold a complainant must reach in order to overcome the protection
afforded by qualified immunity. Keeping the importance and necessity of
qualified immunity in mind—as defined by the Supreme Court—it should
be concerning, then, that the trend that serves as the topic of this Note
severely threatens the availability and viability of qualified immunity as an
affirmative defense.
2. Bryant v. Meriden Police Department
The fallout of Bryant v. Meriden Police Department is the result of an
altercation between Meriden police officers and a suspect, Derrick Bryant,
whom they arrested after a buy-and-bust operation in a liquor store parking
lot.65 During the arrest, to which Bryant was actively resisting, officers
witnessed the suspect attempt to place a bag of crack cocaine between his
buttocks in order to prevent its confiscation.66 The bag remained in place
until he was in a holding cell at the Meriden Police Department about an
hour later.67 When officers attempted to conduct Bryant’s strip search,
Bryant refused to comply and appeared to be reaching into his pants.68 The
officers were unaware if he had been keeping any weapons concealed on his
person, so for their own safety, Officer John Slezak, who had his taser
displayed as a warning, then tased Bryant one time in drive-stun mode.69 At
that point, Bryant relaxed his muscles and the officers were able to
confiscate the crack without conducting an anal cavity search.70 All of the
proceedings were recorded on a soundless, poor quality closed-circuit
television recording, on which the plaintiff—and ultimately the
63
See id. at 552 (citations omitted) (“Today, it is again necessary to reiterate the longstanding
principle that ‘clearly established law’ should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality.’ As this Court
explained decades ago, the clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.
Otherwise, ‘plaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of virtually
unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.’ The panel majority
misunderstood the ‘clearly established’ analysis: It failed to identify a case where an officer acting under
similar circumstances as Officer White was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.”).
64
See id. at 551 (citations omitted) (“In the last five years, this Court has issued a number of
opinions reversing federal courts in qualified immunity cases. The Court has found this necessary both
because qualified immunity is important to society as a whole, and because as an immunity from suit,
qualified immunity is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”).
65
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 1, Bryant v. Meriden Police Dep’t, No. 3:13-cv-449(SRU) (D.
Conn. Aug. 7, 2017).
66
Id. at 6.
67
Id. at 27.
68
Id. at 6.
69
Id. at 7.
70
Id. at 6–7.
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71

judge—relied heavily in making their case. Bryant sued nine officers and
the Meriden Police Department for, inter alia, excessive force and
unreasonable search.72
At trial the remaining defendants were six Meriden police officers,
including Officers K. Egan and John Slezak.73 Qualified immunity was not
raised prior to trial due to remaining material issues of fact regarding the
reasonableness of the force used.74 Defendants and plaintiff presented
conflicting testimony during trial with regard to the number of tasings and
the extent of the strip-search.75 Having clearly credited the defendants’
testimony, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers on all counts
brought by plaintiff at trial.76
On March 31, 2017, the court issued a thirty-three-page opinion granting
plaintiff’s post-verdict Rule 59 motion for a new trial on the count of
excessive force against Officers K. Egan and John Slezak.77 The court
recounts the evidence submitted during trial, continuously repeating that the
jury had the right to determine the credibility of every shred of evidence,
with the exception of the evidence submitted in defense against the excessive
force claim.78 The court states that it “should avoid disturbing a jury’s
evaluation of a witness’s credibility,” yet goes on to disturb the jury’s
evaluation of the officers’ testimonies regarding their fear for their safety in
the holding cell, which defendants submitted as justification for the use of
force.79
71

See id. at 4–5 n.3 (“[T]he court relied heavily on the video,” and, “[t]hat erroneous conclusion
was flatly contradicted by the defendant’s trial testimony. . . .); see also Bryant v. Meriden Police Dep’t,
No. 3:13-cv-449 (SRU), 2017 WL 1217090, at *11 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2017) (“The video confirms that
Bryant posed no threat to the officers individually or collectively while handcuffed in the holding cell.”),
appeal filed, 2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2017; id. at *12 (“The closed-circuit video shows no evidence that Bryant
offered any degree of active resistance at any time. Though the officers testified that they feared he had
something in his pants that he was trying to access, there is no evidence that they reasonably believed
Bryant to be in possession of a weapon.”).
72
Bryant, 2017 WL 1217090, at *2.
73
Id.
74
It should be noted, however, that plaintiff never filed a motion for summary judgment, which the
court at one point indicated could have been sustained and granted based on the closed-circuit video
alone. See id. (“Bryant did not move for summary judgment, so I had no occasion to consider whether
the officers’ use of force against Bryant was unreasonable as a matter of law.”).
75
See id. at *3 (explaining the parties’ competing testimonies—Bryant claims he was tased more
than once and that Officer Egan inserted his fingers into Bryant’s anal cavity, while the Officers assert
(and the Taser report indicates) that Bryant was tased only once, and that they were able to recover the
bag of crack without conducting a cavity search).
76
Judgment, Bryant v. Meriden Police Dep’t, No. 3:13-cv-449(SRU) (D. Conn. May 9, 2016).
77
Bryant, 2017 WL 1217090.
78
Id. at *4–5.
79
See id. at *5, *11 (glazing over the serious nature of Bryant’s offense by characterizing it as
“simple possession of narcotics”). Bryant was charged with, inter alia, Possession of Narcotics with
Intent to Sell within 1500 feet of a School, and Assault on a Police Officer. Brief for DefendantAppellant, supra note 65, at 21 n.17.
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The court also considers the defense of qualified immunity, which was
raised in the defendant’s opposition to plaintiff’s Rule 59 motion.80 The
court unilaterally denied qualified immunity as a defense for Officers Egan
and Slezak, despite the fact that: 1) the jury returned a verdict stating that no
violation of the law had occurred during the altercation,81 and 2) the court
had denied defendants’ request to submit special interrogatories to the jury
along with the verdict form to help make a qualified immunity determination
in the event that plaintiff was successful in establishing a constitutional
violation. Effectively, because defendants were successful in obtaining a
jury verdict at trial, a qualified immunity analysis was never necessary. But
once the court granted the new trial and defendants tried to raise qualified
immunity, the court refused to award it because he disagreed with the fact
that no violation had occurred, and personally believed it to have been
unreasonable for the officers to have believed their actions were lawful.
The court erred in its decision that the jury’s verdict on the taser claim
was against the weight of the evidence and that the officers were not entitled
to qualified immunity.82 First, the facts upon which the jury relied to make
its credibility determinations were effectively ignored by the court. Instead,
the court used what it regarded as “undisputed facts” to conduct its Graham
analysis and determine that the taser use violated the plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment rights as a matter of law.83 The court’s “clearly established law”
analysis was flawed because it used pepper spray cases to assert that the law
on taser use was clearly established.84 It used a dissimilar case to attempt to
make this argument because, at the time of the incident, no case on point
existed to make it undeniable that the law was established with regard to
Taser use.85 Further, the court gave too much weight to the video evidence,
which it claimed was almost dispositive of the issue at hand.86

80

Bryant, 2017 WL 1217090, at *14.
Qualified immunity is not necessary if no violation has occurred, and even if a violation has
occurred, qualified immunity is not precluded.
82
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 65, at 11–12.
83
Bryant, 2017 WL 1217090, at *5.
84
See Bryant, 2017 WL 1217090, at *15 (emphasis added) (“[T]he clearest statement of the law in
the Second Circuit regarding the use of force akin to that of a Taser was Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d
at 98. In Tracy, the Second Circuit held that it was objectively unreasonable for an officer to use pepper
spray ‘mere inches away from the face of a defendant already in handcuffs and offering no further active
resistance.’”).
85
See Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 65, at 34 (pointing out the flaw in the court’s
assertion that it was clearly established at the time of the incident that the use of force at issue was
unlawful, by noting that the court does not follow up its bold statement with a citation to a Second Circuit
or Supreme Court citation, thereby negating any possibility that the law could have been clearly
established).
86
See id. at 15 n.12 (“The district court’s heavy reliance on the grainy, muted, holding cell video is
misplaced.”); see also Bryant, 2017 WL 1217090, at *11 (emphasis added) (“[T]he videotape shows
conclusively that Bryant posed no immediate threat to the officers or others at the time of the tasing.”).
81
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments for Bryant
in February 2018.
3. Huaman v. Tinsley
Huaman v. Tinsley began with a “troubled” truant boy refusing to go to
his court-ordered psychological evaluation.87 Since neither his mother nor a
caseworker from the Connecticut Department of Children and Families
(“DCF”) could get the boy to get dressed and leave the house, Officer
Woodrow Tinsley from the East Hartford Police Department (“EHPD”) was
sent to the house to assist.88 After speaking with the boy, who remained
uncooperative, Officer Tinsley took the boy by the arm and helped him up
off the couch.89 The boy refused to get dressed, so Officer Tinsley told him
they would have to go with him dressed as he was.90 On their way to the
door, the boy not only began resisting, but began fighting with Officer
Tinsley, kicking and punching him and bracing himself against the frame of
the door, refusing to leave.91
Although there is conflicting testimony over the force used by Officer
Tinsley after the boy began to fight him,92 the issue at hand centered on
whether the initial use of force—Officer Tinsley taking the boy by the
arm—was per se excessive.93 After a jury trial, defendant Officer Tinsley
was found not liable on all counts.94 However, in (almost) unprecedented
fashion, the court granted plaintiff’s Rule 59 motion for a new trial on the
counts of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and
excessive force against Officer Tinsley.95 And, the court did so in a similar
way to how the court in Bryant went about doing so, issuing its own lengthy

87

Huaman v. Tinsley, No. 3:13-cv-484(MPS), 2017 WL 4365155, at *1 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2017).
Id.
89
See id. at *5 (referencing testimony given by Officer Tinsley, who testified that the boy “assisted”
him when he pulled on his arm to get him off the couch, and that he “started walking with” the officer
towards the door).
90
Id. at *4.
91
See id. at *5 (“[O]nce we got closer to the door he started to change his action and attitude and
started to resist, and then he pushed up against the door [with his] hands on the door frame to keep himself
from going out.”).
92
The boy’s mother gave testimony that Officer Tinsley had dragged her son to the door and was
punching him, but Officer Tinsley denied this, stating that he was only encouraging the boy towards the
door by his arm. Id. at *6. Given the verdict in the defendant’s favor, the jury credited the Officer’s
testimony. Id. at *11.
93
See id. at *13 (citation omitted) (“There was no justification for Tinsley to have used the force
that he did [on the way from the couch to the door]; under these circumstances, any amount of force was
excessive.”).
94
Id. at *2.
95
Id. at *18. This Rule 59 motion, like in Bryant, was pleaded in the alternative, attached to an
improperly pleaded Rule 50(b) motion.
88

2018]

PLAYING BY THE RULES (OR NOT)

1063

opinion in which it primarily relied on out-of-Circuit precedent to justify its
decision.96
The court erred in its analysis and decision in Huaman on the grounds
that it, again, conducted a flawed “clearly established” inquiry—failing to
properly apply White v. Pauly—and therefore the court’s decision on
qualified immunity was improper. The court also mischaracterizes the
events—usurping fact-finding power from the jury—by coming to opposite
conclusions on factual issues and, as in Bryant, downplaying the danger
posed by the plaintiff.97 Following the court’s grant of a new trial, the
Huaman parties have subsequently settled.98
III.

INCENTIVES AND REPERCUSSIONS OF RULE 59 END-RUNS

A. Why Is This Happening?
With every new trend comes a host of reasons for the change. The same
can be said for the District of Connecticut’s repurposing of Rule 59 in the
manner described supra. When conducting an evaluation as to how the
effects of a phenomenon will play out, it is important to first consider what
caused the change to occur. The causational factors in this case can be
broken down in to three distinct categories: 1) pressures of the legal system
itself, 2) judicial biases, and 3) judicial ambitions.
1. The Pressures of the Legal System
The nature of the judicial system as it currently stands not only fails to
incentivize bringing cases to trial, but discourages doing so. Whether by
disposing of a case pre-trial, or adding incentives to settle during trial, the
pressures placed on parties by the system today all reduce the number of
cases resolved by a jury verdict.99 The prevalence of ADR, for example, has
96

The court relied heavily on State v. Davis, 261 Conn. 553 (2002), a Connecticut Supreme Court
decision, instead of any binding Second Circuit precedent—likely because there was no binding Second
Circuit precedent on this issue. Huaman, 2017 WL 4365155 at *16.
97
See id. at *14 (referring to the way in which Tinsley brought the boy to the door as “dragging”
him from the couch and “prying his hands from the doorframe,”—the same way the boy’s mother
characterized the events in her testimony, which the jury clearly discredited). The court further
mischaracterizes the events by describing Officer Tinsley as “merely fac[ing] a child who did not want
to attend an appointment,” id. at *13, conveniently ignoring the fact that this “child” weighed 200 pounds
and was truant and uncooperative, id. at *18 n.1.
98
Jesse Leavenworth, East Hartford Settles Federal Complaint Against Cop, HARTFORD COURANT
(Feb.
7,
2018),
http://www.courant.com/community/east-hartford/hc-news-east-hartford-suitsettlement-20180207-story.html [https://perma.cc/BPB8-JPMP]. The Huaman settlement directly
illustrates the point of this Note, which is that the tactic of using Rule 59 to remove properly awarded
jury verdicts only intensifies the pressure to resolve cases outside the courtroom, without the assistance
of a jury of one’s peers.
99
See Langbein, supra note 28, at 571 (footnotes omitted) (“Although the central dynamic in the
disappearance of trial has been the substitution of discovery-induced settlements and dismissals, other
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increased due to legislative requirements requiring federal district courts to
implement systems that promote its use.100
Arbitration and mediation grease judicial wheels by simultaneously
resolving cases and lightening judge dockets.101 By participating in an
arbitration or mediation, parties agree to seek an end to their dispute without
pleading their case in front of a jury or a judge.102 These mechanisms offer
benefits of expediency and, in the case of arbitration, finality, without
shelling out the extreme costs normally associated with a full trial.103 It is,
therefore, hard to argue against the implementation of these avenues of
dispute resolution. However, they contribute in great part to the declining
number of cases that reach the trial stage, due simply to their nature.
Arbitrations in particular are routinely the result of many consumer
disputes with larger companies. Cell phone service providers, for example,
are notorious for using mandatory arbitration provisions in their customer
contracts.104 Therefore, not only are parties often opting for arbitration, but
in many situations, they have no choice.105 Arbitration clauses serve the
purpose of either deterring a lawsuit altogether, or keeping the lawsuit from
clogging up already overburdened judicial dockets. With judges and other
judicial actors, including the parties themselves, increasingly using ADR, it
is inevitable that the decline of jury trials will only continue.
Accepting this as true, it seems nonsensical for the judges to grant the
Rule 59 motions in Bryant and Huaman, as the new trials would undoubtedly
lengthen the case life and delay the efficiency of the system. Instead of
looking for the quickest path to the end of the case, the court intentionally
extended the process, twice. If it is true that judges try to minimize their
docket load as quickly as possible, then it would make sense for both judges
in these situations to have let the jury verdicts stand. Their proactive actions
went against the norm—they defied the standard. However, this should not
be viewed as an attempt to save the jury trial or promote active litigation.
factors have also been at work . . . . Judges have welcomed the case management role, which has enhanced
judicial authority both in promoting settlement and in pretrial (non-trial) adjudication.”).
100
See id. at 561 (discussing the legislature’s mandate enacted in 1998 which, in its accompanying
findings, touts the benefits of ADR which include, “greater satisfaction of the parties, innovative methods
of resolving disputes, and greater efficiency in achieving settlements”).
101
Id.
102
See id. (footnote omitted) (“Alternative dispute resolution programs of various sorts, notably
arbitration and mediation . . . operate apart from the civil courts.”).
103
Id.
104
See AT&T Mobility v. Concepción, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (upholding the conscionability of
class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts); see also Sanford M. Jaffe & Linda Stamato, Private
Justice: Losing Our Day in Court, 34 ALTERNATIVES 163, 163 (2016) (“[Mandatory arbitration] has
grown exponentially in the past two decades as the U.S. Supreme Court opened the floodgates with
decisions like AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion . . . . People don’t seem to know or care about mandatory
arbitration until they find they have signed contracts that require them to use it when they have a dispute
with their cellphone provider, bank, nursing home, [or other consumer service providers].”).
105
Jaffe & Stamato, supra note 104, at 163.
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Rather, the new trials may have been an attempt to push the parties to settle,
ensuring financial recovery for the plaintiffs, while keeping juror opinions
out of it.
Settlements, like ADR proceedings, usually remove cases from court
dockets more quickly than litigation.106 However, the settlement process can
be lengthy and contentious if both parties refuse to make concessions to
reach a workable agreement amicably. Further, during the time that the
parties are attempting to settle, the case remains on the judge’s docket and
continues to progress towards trial in the event that the settlement falls
through.107 However, settlements are often utilized both to avoid trial
expenses and to keep the encounter productive rather than hostile. The
drawback to settlement, though, is that in many situations, parties who may
not actually be responsible for the damage that occurred may be forced to
settle due to an inability to completely guarantee a success at trial. The
unpredictable nature of trials turns the decision over whether to settle or try
the case into a gamble that, for defendants whose pockets are limited, may
not be worth the risk.
The use of Rule 59 in the manner described is akin to pushing ADR or
settlement in the sense that it doubles down on the pressure to settle by
raising the stakes for both parties. So, while it does not attempt to cut the
legal process short as most other ADR mechanisms do, it accomplishes the
same goal and outcome of preventing a jury from having the final say. As
seen in Huaman,108 and as can be speculated for Bryant,109 therefore, the new
trial orders likely served or will serve as a driving force to reach a settlement
because clients’ bills will only continue to increase. Since these disputes
involve civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the possibility of
attorney’s fees also looms in the background.110 The pressure on the
officers—and the towns and cities that indemnify them—to settle before
incurring additional attorney’s fees of their own, as well as the fees of
victorious adversaries, can be enough to force their hand despite the fact that
a jury has already cleared them of liability. Since the judges in Bryant and
Huaman indicated that each verdict in the defendants’ favor was a
“miscarriage of justice,”111 it is not likely that either judge would allow
106
See Langbein, supra note 28, at 561 (“Settlement of a civil dispute has material advantages over
adjudication. Settlement is usually cheaper and faster . . . .”).
107
See id. (stating that settlements only benefit the public, “so long as adjudication is preserved as
a viable alternative . . . .”).
108
Huaman ex rel. J.M. v. Tinsley, No. 3:13-cv-484 (MPS), 2017 WL 4365155 (D. Conn. Sept. 28,
2017).
109
Bryant v. Meriden Police Dep’t, No. 3:13-cv-449 (SRU), 2017 WL 1217090 (D. Conn. Mar. 31,
2017), appeal filed, 2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2017.
110
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
section[] . . . 1983 . . . of this title . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”).
111
Bryant, 2017 WL 1217090, at *1; Huaman, 2017 WL 4365155, at *7.
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additional defense verdicts to stand. This risk was too high for the Huaman
parties, leading to the $315,425 settlement.112 In a Hartford Courant article
that discusses the settlement, Town Council Chairman Rich Kehoe explains
that, “given the potential for a significant verdict against the town, the
Council decided it was in the best interest of the taxpayers to settle.”113 Only
time will tell if Bryant will eventually result in the same outcome.
2. Lack of Objectivity
The second factor playing a role in the improper use of Rule 59 may be
a lack of objectivity on the part of the court. The job of a judge—and
particularly a federal judge—is to be an impartial, neutral body that will
judge the case, not the parties.114 Judge Richard Posner notes that lawyers
who seek judgeships know that they will be tasked with the job of being a
fair arbiter of the law.115 He also, however, acknowledges that humans are
imperfect, and that no one can ignore every encounter or experience they
have had in their lives.116 Nor can judges who have tried many cases in the
same field ignore trends or patterns they have witnessed over the course of
their tenure.117 Humans cannot “think in a vacuum.”118 It is possible that,
faced with situations in Bryant and Huaman that appeared unfair and unjust,
the judges used their ability to order a new trial to make up for plaintiffs’
failures to properly plead their motions for judgment as a matter of law.
In a time of heightened scrutiny against police brutality and police use
of force,119 the judges may have been—whether consciously or

112

Leavenworth, supra note 98. The language within the settlement agreement itself stipulates that
Officer Tinsley is not being held liable for the damage caused and that the settlement should not be
construed as to indicate any such liability. Id. Therefore, the only discernable difference in detriment to
Officer Tinsley between the original jury verdict and the settlement agreement is the fact that he (or
rather, the Town of East Hartford) now owes Huaman over $300k.
113
Id.
114
See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 88 (Harvard Univ. Press 2008) (footnote omitted)
(discussing Aristotle’s concept of “corrective justice” and defining it as “judging the case rather than the
parties” in an effort to live up to the blindfolded image of Lady Justice that serves as the symbol of the
American judicial system).
115
Id.
116
Id. at 69.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
See Carl Bialik, Police Officers Say Scrutiny of Police Killings Has Made Their Job Tougher,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 11, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/police-officers-say-scrutiny-ofpolice-killings-has-made-their-job-tougher/ [https://perma.cc/W3JD-S6RM] (highlighting hesitation on
the part of police to “stop and question suspicious people” due to the heightened tension and public
scrutiny placed on them in the wake of numerous high-profile deaths of African Americans at the hands
of police officers); see also Mark Berman & Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., U.S. Police Chiefs Blast Trump for
Endorsing ‘Police Brutality’, WASH. POST (July 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2017/07/29/u-s-police-chiefs-blast-trump-for-endorsing-police-brutality/?utm_term=.5a7079
947c26 [https://perma.cc/8JPL-M28P] (discussing backlash against President Trump for stating that
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unconsciously—inclined to remedy wrongs that they felt deserved both
acknowledgement and curing. Though the “force” at issue in each case is
vastly different and incomparable in terms of the amount used and the
gravity of the situation, both were considered unreasonable by the presiding
judges.120 When faced with a situation where a plaintiff was making a claim
that a sworn officer of the law had abused his power and used excessive
force, it is easy to see how a judge might struggle to find in favor of the
officer, giving the “victim” nothing in return. However, as Posner posits in
his discussion about reasons for apparent judicial bias, “[i]f an arresting offer
says one thing and the person he arrested says the opposite, the judge’s
decision as to which one to believe is likely to be influenced by the judge’s
background.”121 It is no fault of a judge to be human. The fault lies in
situations where a judge allows his background and experiences to justify
overriding the consensus of a group of citizens gathered as a jury, and to say
that his experiences are more instructive than the collective experiences of
those chosen to serve.
3. Judicial Ambitions
The third possible cause of the unprecedented decisions emerging from
the District of Connecticut could be judicial aspiration to a higher bench.
These rulings may have been nothing more than attempts to bolster profiles
for when appointments to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals are made.
Though all federal judges have lifetime appointments, the judicial system
keeps incentives in place to make sure judges do not become lazy.122 For
example, the “six-months” list—more formally the Civil Justice Reform Act
Report123—uses a system of “name and shame”124 to show the judicial
community which judges have motions pending on their docket for longer
than six months.125 Though there are no punishments for ending up on the
list, judges still feel pressure to stay off it for reputational purposes.126 Much
police officers “rough[] up” people who get arrested because it appears to be an endorsement of police
brutality).
120
Bryant v. Meriden Police Dep’t, No. 3:13-cv-449(SRU), 2017 WL 1217090, at *14 (D. Conn.
Mar. 31, 2017) (“[I]t was against the weight of the evidence for a jury to find that Slezak’s use of the
taser was reasonable under the circumstances.”), appeal filed, 2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2017; Huaman ex rel. J.M.
v. Tinsley, No. 3:13-cv-484(MPS), 2017 WL 4365155, at *13 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2017) (“[U]nder these
circumstances, any amount of force was excessive.”).
121
POSNER, supra note 114, at 69.
122
See id. at 142 (discussing how reputational pressures and possibilities of being promoted serve
as incentives to keep judges motivated to produce quality work).
123
28 U.S.C. § 476 (2012).
124
See Name and Shame, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2018) (“[T]o publicly say that a
person, group, or business has done something wrong[.]”).
125
See POSNER, supra note 114, at 140–41 (“Many federal district judges are sensitive about the
quarterly statistics . . . that show how many cases a judge has had under advisement for more than a
specified length of time . . . .”).
126
Id. at 141.
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of the power of a judge stems from his reputation and credibility, which he
gains through his years of practice.127
Though most judges are content laboring “in obscurity,”128 it is
inevitable that some will aim to gain celebrity.129 The judges we quote and
remember by name are those who drafted biting dissents, produced quotable
interpretations of the law, and defied normative standards.130 Judges who
have their sights set on a higher seat may, therefore, try to make a name for
themselves by being trendsetters. Critics of this sort of judicial activism base
their arguments on the notion that unelected judges striking down publicly
supported laws and policies thwart popular sovereignty,131 but David R.
Dow compares so-called judicial activists to “prophet[s]” who simply saw
something before any other had the chance, and made it known.132 Bryant
and Huaman could possibly be these judges’ attempts to “prophetize”
themselves, and would therefore explain their departures from the norm. At
the time of the Bryant decision, no similar fact pattern had been considered
by any district or circiut court in the United States, including Connecticut
and the Second Circuit.133 Therefore, the eventual resolution of Bryant will
be instructive, particularly in the wake of the Huaman settlement.134
B. So What?
Many aspects of our legal system have changed since its inception.
Procedurally, the Federal Rules are revised periodically, bringing about slow
but steady change.135 Practically, uncodified standards of decorum shift as
well.136 With regards to the Rule 59 avenue opening for judges to circumvent
improper pleadings and jury decisions, the fluid nature of the judiciary begs
127

See id. at 140 (“People care about their reputation even when it is not a potential source of
tangible rewards. Rank orderings and prizes have psychological effects distinct from any career effects
of being singled out from one’s fellows.”).
128
Id. at 61–62.
129
Id.
130
The late Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, is well known for his sharp dissenting opinions.
131
DAVID R. DOW, AMERICA’S PROPHETS: HOW JUDICIAL ACTIVISM MAKES AMERICA GREAT 81
(2009).
132
Id. at 10.
133
Bryant v. Meriden Police Dep’t, No. 3:13-cv-449(SRU), 2017 WL 1217090 (D. Conn. Mar. 31,
2017) appeal filed, 2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2017. This is made clear by the court’s need to use a pepper spray
case to try and show clearly established law.
134
See Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 65, at 20 (“[T]he lower court . . . simply jumped
to the legal conclusion that ‘[t]he use of a taser constituted a significant degree of force’ as a matter of
law. No Second Circuit precedent supports this blanket proposition . . . .”)
135
For example, the last amendment to the FRCP was made to Rule 4 in 2017. Current Rules of
Practice & Procedure, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/current-rules-practiceprocedure [https://perma.cc/W346-X3SY] (last visited Mar. 9, 2018).
136
See Anderson, supra note 3, at 103 (describing the abrasive litigation style of attorney Spot
Mozingo, and commenting that though he was a fabulous lawyer, his argument style and language “may
not pass muster” in today’s courtroom, whereas it was normal behavior in the 1960s).

2018]

PLAYING BY THE RULES (OR NOT)

1069

the question of, “so what?”—change is a part of the system, after all. Would
it really be that terrible for this shift to gain a foothold? To some, the answer
is likely no. As Stephan Landsman points out in his chapter of World Jury
Systems, in most other countries that utilize juries, the judge in those systems
has more power over his jury and more control over directing how that jury
understands and weighs the evidence of the case, than that of the United
States federal judge.137 Why, then, should it matter if this new precedent is
established, when United States judges would, even after its legitimization,
still wield less power over juries than judges do globally? It is a hard
question to answer at first pass. However, if this trend becomes
commonplace and evolves from being just a trend to being a routine tactic
used by plaintiffs and defendants alike, it could have serious repercussions.
1. Encouraging Settlement
Perhaps the most obvious result of this tactic being given precedential
weight by a Second Circuit affirmation would be that the already-pressing
encouragement to settle cases would increase exponentially. Lawyers
already feel pressure to settle cases as quickly as possible, due in part to
judges’ desires to clear their crowded dockets.138 The pressure also comes
from the risks inherent to presenting evidence to a jury for deliberation.139
The essence of the U.S. jury is that it humanizes an otherwise “mechanistic”
and procedural legal process of applying precedent to facts and determining
an outcome.140 It therefore provides attorneys with the opportunity to test
their luck and skill by foregoing settlement and opting for a trial—if they
can win the jury, they can win their case. Expanding the instances in which
Rule 59 can be used to take a verdict away from a jury diminishes this
opportunity, and would effectively make the risk of choosing trial over
settlement too high to justify.
In instances that involve police officer defendants, specifically, the
pressure will be even heavier. Since the two cases that have followed this
procedural anomaly thus far have involved claims of excessive force against
Connecticut town police officers,141 it is likely that if the trend is to continue,
it will do so in narrowly-similar situations at first, before being expanded to
less similar fact patterns. How, then, are officers supposed to defend
themselves from minor and baseless claims when there is a new dagger
137

Vidmar, supra note 14, at 41–42.
See POSNER, supra note 114, at 141 (describing federal district judges’ sensitivity to pressures
placed on them to maintain efficient dockets).
139
Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375,
375 (2011).
140
See Vidmar, supra note 14, at 1 (“Juries inject community values into the formal legal process,
and thus they can bring a sense of equity and fairness against the cold and mechanistic application of
legal rules.”).
141
The officers involved in the Bryant case worked for the City of Meriden, and the officer in
Huaman worked for the Town of East Hartford.
138
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hanging over their heads, waiting to fall and sever their chances at avoiding
payments to a plaintiff who, per a jury’s judgement, should not be entitled
to any relief? When a judge has not only the audacity, but also the
precedential authorization to flip a jury verdict based on either his own
preconceptions of the parties involved, or his own desire to administer
punishment where he sees it fit, it would be hard to imagine a defense team
that would willingly risk not only enduring one trial, but who would do so
knowing any verdict in their favor would likely be taken from the jury by
the judge, in the interest of justice. Settlement, therefore, would become an
almost automatic response in these situations, which down the road could
result in a system abused by any arrestee to punish an officer who was only
doing his or her job by taking the suspect into custody.
It is likely that qualified immunity would effectively be eradicated in
cases of excessive force if settlement becomes the go-to resolution in these
situations. Since qualified immunity can only be raised in the trial setting,142
parties forced into settlements due to the likelihood of a jury verdict override
will be precluded from having the opportunity to utilize this defense. Wouldbe-victorious defendants will have no choice but to pay settlement money
instead of being shielded from both damages and suit, purely because the
system designed to protect police officers and allow them to do their job
without hesitation has been overridden by a judicial power that can, and will,
strip them of their shield. The Huaman settlement, resulting in the Town of
East Hartford paying plaintiff over three hundred thousand dollars, shows
that this threat is not just speculation—it is beginning to play out in actuality.
2. Forum Shopping and Safety
The use of Rule 59 to bypass a jury verdict in a § 1983 case has, thus
far, only occurred in the District Court for the District of Connecticut.143 It
is not possible to say at this juncture whether this will begin to occur in other
circuits. If it does not, and the Second Circuit becomes an outlier by either
affirming or denying to hear Bryant on jurisdictional grounds, it will be
interesting to see if the Supreme Court decides to resolve the split. With the
Supreme Court only granting certiorari to around 100 of the 7,000 cases for
which it receives petitions each year,144 however, it is unlikely that this issue
would be granted cert. Over the last few years, the Supreme Court has
already issued rulings on cases that affect police officers and qualified
142
See 59 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 291 (2000) (defining qualified immunity as an affirmative
defense).
143
Bryant v. Meriden Police Dep’t, No. 3:13-cv-449(SRU), 2017 WL 1217090 (D. Conn. Mar. 31,
2017), appeal filed, 2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2017; Huaman ex rel. J.M. v. Tinsley, No. 3:13-cv-484(MPS), 2017
WL 4365155 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2017).
144
About the Supreme Court, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/about
[https://perma.cc/
G2AJ-DPNF].
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immunity, making clear that they are fed up with circuit courts misapplying
the doctrine.145 The Supreme Court may decide not to address this particular
issue simply because they have handled similar cases recently. If a circuit
split develops, therefore, attempts to forum-shop could become more
frequent in situations where the new procedure would be a game-changer.
Plaintiffs who believe they could state enough of a claim to get a jury verdict
flipped
would
attempt
to
file
suit
in
districts—like the District of Connecticut—where this tactic has roots. This,
in turn, will create an environment in which Connecticut town police officers
will be hesitant to take any action, in order to avoid being pinned against a
legal wall and forced to pay settlement money for something as small as an
allegedly too-tight handcuffing.146 Inconsistencies in the application of Rule
59 could therefore decrease the quality of police forces in districts where this
circumvention tactic has been successful, which in the long term could affect
the safety of that district’s citizenry.
3. Elimination of Civil Jury Trials
The least likely, yet arguably most damaging outcome of this trend
gaining a foothold would be the elimination of the civil jury trial altogether.
After all, if a judge is going to make a decision based on his own
preconceptions and assessments anyway, why bother with the charade of a
jury trial? We might as well do away with it altogether. It could never happen
overnight, of course. The outrage that would ensue following a formal,
public declaration eliminating the option for a jury trial would likely mirror
that which occurred during the colonial era when the drafters of the
Constitution voiced their opinions that jury trials, “although valuable . . .
might not be essential, especially in civil cases.”147 The Anti-Federalist
threats to reject the Constitution entirely on the basis of its failure to
guarantee a civil jury trial ultimately led to the Seventh Amendment.148 As
a result of television programs like Law & Order, lessons taught in U.S.
History and Civics classes, and general notions about what it means to be an
American, the public holds the idea of having a trial by jury near and dear
to its heart.149 Citizens who are not involved in the legal system, especially,
145
See White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (“Today, it is
again necessary to reiterate the longstanding principle that clearly established law should not be defined
at a high level of generality.”).
146
See Sharnick v. D’Archangelo, 935 F. Supp. 2d 436, 442 (D. Conn. 2013) (involving a dispute
over whether or not handcuffs were correctly placed on an arrestee, who argued that improper
handcuffing technique resulted in injury to his wrist—despite numerous contradictions throughout his
testimony).
147
See Landsman, supra note 16, at 385 (referencing THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
148
Id. at 385–86.
149
A survey conducted by the American Society of Trial Consultants, in collaboration with the
NYU School of Law Civil Jury Project, determined that after asking a “large sample size of U.S. Citizens
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would have no way of knowing how new procedures and tactics are shaping,
and effectively negating, the use of juries to a point where they may as well
not be there at all.150 Therefore, a formal elimination of jury trials would
appear to be a drastic transgression on American liberty to the
unsophisticated consumer of modern day hype-media.
However, the elimination of the jury trial in more quiet fashion is not
precluded. Parties may soon begin to opt for bench trials after figuring that
if a judge is going to steal a verdict from the jury, they may as well skip the
jury step and let the judge be the fact-finding body from the beginning.
Parties may also simply give into the pressures placed on them and settle, as
discussed above.151 The de facto elimination of jury trials by avoiding their
use could render the deliberative body a thing of the past; a fossil, left to be
admired by future historians who will wonder how and why juries were ever
used in civil cases in the first place.
4. Or Maybe, More Efficiency?
It is possible that I am over-inflating the doom-and-gloom aspect of the
changes that would result from the Bryant ruling being written into
precedent. It is possible that Bryant and Huaman are isolated incidents.
Maybe the court’s intentions are genuine and this change would be for the
better.152 Perhaps this could actually result in a more efficient process that
focuses on shortening the length of a legal case from the filing of the
complaint to the closing of the file. If the jury trial is effectively eliminated,
we as a society would be foregoing the opportunity to have civil disputes
settled by neutral citizens. However, juries often create inefficiencies in
instances when they cannot come to a decision, when they act
inappropriately,153 or when they use their appearance of neutrality to
administer biased relief.154 The alleged biases and criticisms that can be

from various demographic backgrounds,” two-thirds of the respondents believed that the right to a civil
jury trial was “somewhat to very important,” though, shockingly, over 75 percent of respondents were
unaware that civil jury trials are declining in frequency. ASTC CONSULTANT ADVISORS, PUBLIC
SURVEY I: PUBLIC OPINIONS OF CIVIL JURY TRIALS 8 (2017), http://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/ASTC-CJP-Public-Survey-I-Public-Opinions-of-Civil-Jury-Trials-December2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/76GA-58HE].
150
Id. at 4–5.
151
See Part III.A.1, supra (discussing the pressures the legal system places on parties to resolve
cases prior to trial, either through settlement or ADR).
152
After all, the nature of a judgeship often results in hardworking judges who are not just seeking
the path of least resistance. Judges take their position knowing they will be overworked, and many work
long past their retirement eligibility date. Posner posits this may be because they enjoy working hard and
find their position to be one of nobility. See POSNER, supra note 114, at 61–62.
153
For example, ignoring their instructions or making decisions based on emotion and not facts.
154
Novels like To Kill A Mockingbird and A Time to Kill comment on the prevalence of racial bias
among juries during both the Jim Crow Era and modern day America. Though the trials were executed
under the guise of fairness, the verdicts were anything but fair.
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attributed to judges can often just as easily be applicable to juries,
particularly in areas where jury-pool diversity is lacking.
The elimination of juries may very well streamline a process that many
citizens utilize to resolve problems that cannot be disposed of otherwise.
This could help remedy a major criticism of the legal system as it stands,
which is the exorbitant cost of bringing a case.155 With no jury, there is no
need to charge hourly for events like the voir dire process,156 and parties who
win at trial—much like the defendants in Bryant and Huaman—would not
be faced with the potential burden of having to pay for not one, but two trials
when a judge decides that the jury made the wrong decision. If the judge is
the main fact finder from the beginning, this problem would be eliminated
entirely, and serious time and money would be saved on both sides of the
aisle.
5. Proposals
While the elimination of the jury trial altogether is one way to resolve
the issue at hand, it is clearly an extreme one. Instead, the judicial system
should consider revising some of the ways it utilizes the jury and allows it
to participate in the process. For example, some districts have begun to allow
their juries to take notes during trial to prevent them from having to recall
complex explanations of both events and law from memory over the course
of the trial.157 Other districts have even allowed jury members to submit
written questions to the judge to clarify things they may not understand.158
These implementations could create a greater probability of jury
understanding, particularly in complex cases such as those involving police
force and qualified immunity issues.159 Critics of jury participation say these
systems may be abused as a way for biases to gain a foothold in the

155
See Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury Trials, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 191, 207 (“Hundreds of years
ago, trial by jury was cheaper than hiring a professional corps of judges. But today some argue it has
become a system that it is simply too expensive to use.”).
156
Voir dire is the process by which attorneys select jurors for their trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 47. Voir
dire processes can take days, which could significantly increase a client’s legal bill.
157
See Landsman, supra note 16, at 396 (“A number of judges and scholars have attacked the idea
[of juror passivity] and have suggested that jurors should be encouraged to participate more actively in
the trial process. To this end, many courts have embraced juror note taking.”).
158
In 2015, jurors were permitted to question witnesses in 25 percent of civil jury trials based on a
study of 1,673 state and federal trial courts across the country. Paula Hannaford-Agor, But Have We
Made Any Progress? An Update on the Status of Jury Improvement Efforts in State and Federal Courts,
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (NCSC) CTR. FOR JURY STUDIES 3, 7 (2015),
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/But-have-we-made.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V9YB-FNWR].
159
Shari Seidman Diamond, How Jurors Deal with Expert Testimony and How Judges Can Help,
16 J.L. & POL’Y 47, 64–65 (2007).
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160

deliberations, but the greater threat is arguably that of a jury that does not
have a full grasp of the issue. When a judge thinks a jury has misunderstood
or misanalysed, the judge may be more easily persuaded to grant a Rule 59
motion. But, if the jury is allowed to ask for clarification on its
misunderstandings, the judge would have less leeway to claim the jury made
a mistake.
Additionally, courts could require that in qualified immunity cases, each
jury must answer special interrogatories with regards to the factual
reasonableness determination of the qualified immunity analysis along with
the verdict form, regardless of who their verdict favors. Doing so would
eliminate any speculation as to what the jury must have considered in
arriving at their verdict decision. This would eliminate the possibility of the
qualified immunity procedural catch-22 seen in Bryant and Huaman, in
which the judge—lacking a jury determination on reasonableness because
the original verdicts favored the defendants—was able to inject his own view
of reasonableness into his analysis.161 Mandating special interrogatories
upfront would bolster the qualified immunity doctrine, and could help
revitalize the legitimacy and importance of the jury trial.
CONCLUSION
A frustrating yet exciting aspect of the legal system is its
unpredictability. The truth of the matter is that no one can accurately say
what will become of the jury trial until it happens. Until then, one can only
speculate as to the many paths this journey could take. The vanishing jury
trial is far from a new phenomenon, but the way in which we think about it
as a legal society is evolving. No longer is it fueled simply by a desire for
efficiency and a push to use alternative forms of dispute resolution, but it
now is being aided from the other end by judges who seek to extend the trial
process by granting new trials in the face of verdicts with which they
disagree. How can a jury trial system be eliminated by both streamlining and
lengthening forces, simultaneously? The pushing and pulling of all actors
contributes to the unpredictability that frustrates the efforts of parties who
rely on predictable outcomes to plan the best strategy. This unpredictability
will undermine the jury trial system to a point where its effective eradication
is likely imminent.
As for establishing precedent, the future of civil jurisprudence may very
well turn on the eventual resolution of Bryant. Ultimately, the Second
Circuit could decide to reverse the decision of the District Court in light of
160
See Landsman, supra note 16, at 396 (explaining the risk of allowing jurors to ask questions as
“jurors [] com[ing] to see themselves as advocates or seek[ing] answer to improper or prejudicial
questions.”)
161
See Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 65, at 21–25 (pointing out repeated instances in
which the court made improper factual conclusions while conducting its Graham factor analysis to
determine the reasonability of the officers’ actions for the purposes of qualified immunity).
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the improper considerations and assertions that were used to support the
decisions on appeal. It could also decide to dismiss the pending appeal on
jurisdictional grounds, since it is technically an interlocutory appeal and not
one of a final judgment on the case’s merits. However, if the Second Circuit
affirms the decisions of the District Court, the legal community must watch
closely to see if the prevalence of Rule 59 motions increases. The precipice
on which we stand, waiting to see which way the wind blows, provides a
vantage point from which we can witness the evolution of the U.S. legal
system in real-time. We can only hope that this evolution is for the better.

